Pennsylvania Superior Court Addresses Evidentiary Issues in Civil Damage Claim Involving Workers Compensation Compromise & Release
Kalevelyn Chavers tripped on exposed wires at her place of employment, Easton Hospital causing her to fall and sustain injuries. She filed a workers compensation claim and ultimately settled her claim against her employer for $100,000, including a waiver of subrogation. Chavers also filed a civil damage claim against Penn Cap Group, et al. (“PCG”), alleging that her injuries occurred due to the negligence of PCG, which owned and maintained the property. A jury returned a verdict in Chavers favor in the amount of $160,000. Delay damages were applied to the verdict for a total judgment of $202,814. The parties raised a number of issues on appeal, and the Pennsylvania Superior Court disposed of them as follows:
The Superior Court concluded the trial court erred by denying admission of past medical expenses; allowing the jury to be told that any award of the lien amount would be a double recovery; and by refusing to mold the verdict to include past medical expenses of $228,347.10 (plus delay damages and post judgment interest); and or failing in granting a new trial on damages for the valuation of her past recoverable medical expenses.
42 Pa.C.S.A. § 6141 and the collateral source doctrine. Section 6141 provides, in part:
(a) Personal injuries. — Settlement with or any payment made to an injured person or to others on behalf of such injured person with the permission of such injured person or to anyone entitled to recover damages on account of injury or death of such person shall not constitute an admission of liability by the person making the payment or on whose behalf the payment was made, unless the parties to such settlement or payment agree to the contrary. ….
(c) Admissibility in evidence. — Except in an action in which final settlement and release has been pleaded as a complete defense, any settlement or payment referred to in subsections (a) and (b) shall not be admissible in evidence on the trial of any matter.
Here, Chavers gave up her workers compensation rights to obtain her lien assignment, and was deprived the benefit of her bargain in favor of pardoning the responsible party, i.e., PCG. In Nazarak v. Waite, 216 A.3d 1093 (Pa. Super. 2019), the Court concluded evidence of a workers’ compensation settlement was not admissible in similar circumstances. Accordingly, the Court instructed the trial court to mold the verdict to include Chaver’s past medical expenses, plus delay damages and interest.
The Superior Court concluded that the trial court did not commit prejudicial error by allowing PCG to tell the jury that she did not have to reimburse her employer for the indemnity benefits received. Chavers’ employer paid her 2/3 of her actual wages, and Chavers argued that the jury only awarded her the 1/3 difference of her actual wage loss, and not the entire indemnity lien, which she was entitled to. The trial court properly instructed the jury it could award Chavers her past lost earnings, and did not instruct the jury to make any deductions from its award. The Superior Court presumed that the jury followed the trial court’s instructions. See Renninger v. A&R Mach. Shop, 163 A.3d 988, 1000 (Pa. Super. 2017). Ultimately, the Superior Court agreed with the trial court, and concluded that the jury’s verdict demonstrated a reasonable resemblance to the proven damages.
The Superior Court concluded that the trial court did not err when it precluded her expert’s estimate of the cost of future medical expenses. Chavers’ treating physician was prepared to testify that there was a 50% chance she may need a future knee replacement, with an estimated cost of $100,000. The trial court granting PCG objecting to the admissibility of the evidence because this opinion was purely speculative, and was outside the scope of his records and reports, and the Superior Court affirmed the decision.
The Superior Court concluded that the jury’s zero dollar jury verdict for disfigurement, and loss of household services; and a $25,000 award for pain and suffering demonstrated a reasonable resemblance to the proven damages. Not all injuries are “serious enough to warrant compensation.” Gold v. Rosen, 135 A.3d 1039, 1044 (Pa. Super. 2016). The Court ruled the jury was free to conclude that Chavers’ disfigurement and lost household services were not caused by PCG’s negligence or “the sort of transient rub of life for which compensation is not warranted.” Id. Regarding the alleged inadequacy of the pain and suffering award, our Supreme Court has stated that a reversal of a jury verdict on the grounds of inadequacy is appropriate “only where the injustice of the verdict stands forth like a beacon.” Davis v. Mullen, 773 A.2d 764, 766 (Pa. 2001). The Superior Court was not convinced that the trial court abused its discretion in refusing to disturb the jury’s reasonable verdict.
The Superior Court concluded that the trial court did not err or abuse its discretion by failing to grant judgment in PCG’s favor. PGC argued that according to the lease agreement between PCG and Chavers’ employer, PCG had no duty to manage the property. However, the jury also received evidence to show that PCG owed Chavers a duty to protect from foreseeable harm evidenced by PCG’s control over the property through the lease agreement, building rules, PCG’s exclusive right to service the property, PCG’S maintenance and janitorial responsibilities, and inspections of the property. Chavers v. 1605 Valley Center Pky, LP, 2023 PA Super 73 (Pa. Super. 2023)
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