PA Court Concludes Limited UIM Selection Stands Until Changed

In Goodville Mut. Cas. Co. v. McNear, 2025 PA Super 48 (February 26, 2025), the Pennsylvania Superior Court concluded that an insurer is not required to obtain a new election of lower limits of Underinsured Motorists [UIM] coverage under the MVFRL when a new vehicle is added to an existing policy.

In 2012, the McNears elected UIM coverage of $50,000 each person / $100,000 each accident, stacked across the three vehicles covered by the policy.  The McNears renewed their policy every six months, and between 2012 and 2018, they added and removed vehicles, with the policy covering as many as four and as few as two vehicles.  Goodville did not obtain new limited UIM elections when the McNears added vehicles to their policy, nor did the McNears affirmatively request changes to their UIM benefits or other coverages.  By 2018, the McNears’ policy again covered three vehicles.

In 2018, Mallory McNear was injured in a car accident caused by Thomas.  After recovering the limits of Thomas’ insurance, Goodville paid Mallory UIM benefits in the amount of $150,000, based on the stacked $50,000 limited UIM benefits originally selected in 2012 and the three vehicles covered at the time.  The McNears claimed Goodville was obliged to pay full UIM benefits up to the bodily injury benefits of their policy, i.e., $250,000 stacked across three vehicles, or $750,000 because Goodville failed to obtain new limited UIM selections.

Goodville commenced the underlying action for a judgment declaring it fulfilled its obligation to pay the limited UIM benefits Karen originally selected in 2012. In deciding Goodville’s Motion for Summary Judgment, the trial court rejected the McNears’ arguments based on Barnard v. Travelers Home & Marine Ins. Co., 216 A.3d 1045 (Pa. 2019)[1], and instead found persuasive the decision in Geist v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 49 F.4th 861 (3d Cir. 2022), which rejected similar arguments that Barnard should apply in a case involving selections of limited UIM coverage. The trial court noted Barnard hinged on an interpretation of the term “purchase” in section 1738 of the Pennsylvania Motor Vehicle Financial Responsibility Law (“MVFRL”), 75 Pa.C.S.A. §§ 1701-1799.7, but section 1734 did not use that term.  The trial court further reasoned sections 1731 and 1734 concern different subjects and impose different duties on the insurer and the insured.  The trial court observed that section 1791, which governs notices of available benefits and limits, contains a presumption that the McNears had notice of UIM coverage and did not require Goodville to reissue notices concerning UIM coverage.  Thus, the trial court held that the McNear’s original selection of limited UIM benefits remained effective, and Goodville had no obligation to provide additional notices when the McNears added vehicles.

The Superior Court declined the McNears’ invitation to apply Barnard broadly to hold that an addition of a vehicle required Goodville to obtain a new “signdown.” Instead, the Court concluded that Section 1734 requires only that the insurer “issue” UIM coverage in the amount selected by a named insured in a writing signed by a named insured.  See 75 Pa.C.S.A. § 1734; Cf. Blood v. Old Guard Ins. Co., 934 A.2d 1218, 1226 (Pa. 2007). Moreover, the Court determined that Section 1791 permits an insurer to rely on elections and notices regarding the availability of UIM benefits at the time of application for original coverage.  See 75 Pa.C.S.A. § 1791; Koch v. Progressive Direct Ins. Co., 280 A.3d 1060, 1068 (Pa. Super. 2022); Smith v. Hartford Ins. Co., 849 A.2d 277, 281 (Pa. Super. 2004).  As such, the Court concluded because the McNears completed a “sign-down” selecting limited UIM coverage; did not affirmatively requested a change, in writing, to UIM coverage; and did object to any defects in the section 1791 notices they received the McNears original “sign-down” remained effective at the time Mallory suffered injuries caused by an underinsured motorist. Moreover, the Court held pursuant to section 1791, Goodville was under no obligation to provide additional notices regarding the limited UIM benefits Karen had originally selected.  See 75 Pa.C.S.A. § 1791.

The Court’s opinion in Goodville Mut. Cas. Co. v. McNear, 2025 PA Super 48 (February 26, 2025) can be accessed here.

[1] Barnard concerned waiver of stacking, which is governed by section 1738, not the waiver of UIM benefits under section 1731. In Barnard, the Supreme Court concluded an insured’s decision to increase the UIM benefits she originally selected constituted a “purchase” of coverage within the meaning of section 1738. Thus, the Court found persuasive that the prescribed stacking waiver form in section 1738(d)(2) required an opportunity for the insured to reject stacking for the increased aggregate benefits knowingly and voluntarily. Barnard distinguished, but did not overrule, or criticize, prior decisions discussing section 1791.